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Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must remain silent. 
 
        Ludwig Wittgenstein1 
 
Is our universe a polynomial or an exponential place?  
 
Scott Aaronson2 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The finite age of the universe and the existence of cosmological horizons provides a 
strong argument that the observable universe represents a finite causal region with finite 
material and informational resources. A similar conclusion follows from the holographic 
principle. In this paper I address the question of whether the cosmological information 
bound has implications for fundamental physics. Orthodox physics is based on Platonism: 
the laws are treated as infinitely precise, perfect, immutable mathematical relationships 
that transcend the physical universe and remain totally unchanged by physical processes, 
however extreme. If instead the laws of physics are regarded as akin to computer 
software, with the physical universe as the corresponding hardware, then the finite 
computational capacity of the universe imposes a fundamental limit on the precision of 
the laws and the specifiability of physical states. That limit depends on the age of the 
universe.  I examine how the imprecision of the laws impacts on the evolution of highly 
entangled states and on the problem of dark energy. 
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1. What are the laws of physics? 
 
Gregory Chaitin is undoubtedly one of the most profound thinkers of our time. I have drawn on 
his work at several stages in my own career development, and especially in formulating the ideas 
that follow. It is an honor to contribute to this volume to celebrate Chaitin’s important insights 
into mathematics, computing and physical reality. 
I should like to start with a quotation from Chaitin’s recent book Meta-Math: “Why should I 
believe in a real number if I can’t calculate it, if I can’t prove what its bits are, and if I can’t even 
refer to it? …The real line from 0 to 1 looks more and more like a Swiss cheese.”3 In other words, 
the real line is a useful fiction, an unattainable idealization. The question I wish to address here is 
how this sweeping conclusion impacts on my own field of theoretical physics and cosmology. 
The real line, its extension to the complex plane, together with the related properties of 
differentiability, play an absolutely central role in theoretical physics, on account of the fact that 
all the known fundamental laws of physics are expressed in terms of differentiable functions 
defined over the set of real or complex numbers. So I want to start by asking a very basic, but 
surprisingly little addressed question: What are the laws of physics and where do they come 
from? The subsidiary question, Why do they have the form that they do? I have discussed in 
detail elsewhere.4 
 
First let me articulate the orthodox position, adopted by most theoretical physicists, which is 
that the laws of physics are immutable: absolute, eternal, perfect mathematical relationships, 
infinitely precise in form. The laws were imprinted on the universe at the moment of creation, i.e. 
at the big bang, and have since remained fixed in both space and time. The properties of the 
physical universe depend in an obvious way on the laws of physics, but the basic laws themselves 
depend not one iota on what happens in the physical universe. There is thus a fundamental 
asymmetry: the states of the world are affected by the laws, but the laws are completely 
unaffected by the states – a dualism that goes back to the foundation of physics with Galileo and 
Newton. The ultimate source of the laws is left vague, but it is tacitly assumed to transcend the 
universe itself, i.e. to lie beyond the physical world, and therefore beyond the scope of scientific 
inquiry. The proper task of the physicist, it is often said, is to discover the forms of the laws using 
reason and experiment, adopt them pragmatically, and get on with the job of determining their 
consequences. Inquiry into their origin is discouraged as a quasi-religious quest.  
The orthodox view of the nature of physical laws conforms well to the mathematical doctrine 
of Platonism. Plato regarded mathematical forms and relationships as enjoying a real existence in 
an otherworldly realm, where mathematicians come upon them in a voyage of intellectual 
discovery. A Platonist regards mathematics as possessing an existence independent of the 
physical universe, rather than being a product of the human brain. An essential quality of the 
Platonic heaven is that the mathematical forms it contains are perfect. For example, circles are 
exactly round, in contrast to circles in the physical universe, which are always flawed 
approximations to the idealized Platonic forms. 
Most theoretical physicists are by temperament Platonists. They envisage the laws of physics 
too as perfect idealized mathematical relationships and operations that really exist, located in an 
abstract realm transcending the physical universe. I shall call this viewpoint physical Platonism to 
distinguish it from mathematical Platonism. Newton was a physical Platonist, and cast his laws of 
mechanics and gravitation in terms of what we would now call real numbers and differentiable 
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functions. Taking Newton’s laws seriously implies accepting infinite and infinitesimal quantities, 
and arbitrary precision. The idealized, Platonic notion of the laws of physics reached its zenith 
with the famous claim of Laplace, concerning an omniscient demon. Laplace pointed out that the 
states of a closed deterministic system, such as a finite collection of particles subject to the laws 
of Newtonian mechanics, are completely fixed once the initial conditions are specified5 
 
“We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its 
future. An intellect which at any given moment knew all of the forces that animate nature and the 
mutual positions of the beings that compose it, if this intellect were vast enough to submit the 
data to analysis, could condense into a single formula the movement of the greatest bodies of the 
universe and that of the lightest atom; for such an intellect nothing could be uncertain and the 
future just like the past would be present before its eyes." 
 
If Laplace’s argument is taken seriously, on the assumptions adopted, then everything that 
happens in the universe, including Laplace’s decision to write the above words, my decision to 
write this article, Chaitin’s beautiful work on Omega, etc. are all preordained. The information 
about these events is already contained in the state of the universe at any previous time. To get 
some idea of the demon’s gargantuan task, note the following. If the demon overlooked the 
gravitational force of a single electron located at the edge of the observable universe, then his 
prediction for the motion of a given molecule of air in your living room would be rendered 
completely uncertain after only 12 intermolecular collisions.6 This arresting example reveals how 
exquisitely sensitive to error predicting the future can be.  
Laplace’s vignette is based on classical mechanics, and is usually dismissed by invoking 
quantum mechanics, or arguing that the universe is an open system, but this misses the point. The 
real absurdity in Laplace’s statement is its implicit reliance on physical Platonism extrapolated to 
a staggering degree, made without any experimental foundation whatever. 
In spite of the fact that we now know Newtonian mechanics is only an approximation, 
physical Platonism remains the dominant philosophy among theoretical physicists. The project of 
quantum cosmology, for example, is predicated on the assumption that the laws of quantum 
mechanics and general relativity exist independently of the universe, and may therefore be 
invoked to explain how the universe came to exist from nothing. In the fashionable subject of 
string/M theory, the string Lagrangian, or whatever else serves to determine the unified dynamics, 
is assumed to somehow “already exist”, so that from it may (one day) flow an explanation for 
space, time, matter and force. 
 
2. Laws as software 
 
A completely different view of the relationship between mathematics and physics comes from 
Chaitin’s development of algorithmic information theory, from which he was drawn to the 
conclusion, “A scientific theory is like a computer program that predicts our observations.”7 For 
example, in Newtonian mechanics the initial positions and momenta of a system of particles serve 
as input data, the laws of mechanics are the program, and the final state of the particles at some 
later time of interest corresponds to the output. In this manner, the universe processes information 
automatically as it evolves. So we might envisage the laws of physics in terms of software, as a 
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grand cosmic computer program. This shift of perspective, simple though it may be, has profound 
implications, which are immediately apparent when we ask what is the hardware on which the 
cosmic software is being run? The answer is, of course, the universe itself.  And by this I mean 
the real, physical universe. I am not referring to some imaginary cosmic hardware in a Platonic 
heaven, but the real universe we observe. The significance of this last point is that the real 
universe might very well be finite, that is, have finite resources and age, and thus be subject to 
restrictions on what it can accomplish in regards to computation. 
Why might the universe be finite in resources? What matters for computational purposes is 
not the spatial extent of the universe, but the number of physical degrees of freedom located in a 
causally connected region. Information processed in causally disconnected parts of space cannot 
be considered as belonging to the same “program.” In the standard cosmological models, the 
region of the universe to which we have causal access at this time is limited by the finite speed of 
light and finite age of the universe (since the big bang). That is, there exists a “particle horizon” 
in space, measuring some billions of light years across at this time. The region within our particle 
horizon contains about 1080 particles of matter, and about 1090 photons and neutrinos. If the 
system is treated quantum mechanically, with information encoded in discrete bits (e.g. spin up, 
spin down), then the maximum number of bits of information contained in a horizon volume at 
this time is about 10122 according to Seth Lloyd.8 His calculation takes into account the 
gravitational degrees of freedom too. If the universe is uniform, any other causal region would 
possess a similar upper bound. Thus we may write 
 
Iuniverse ≤ 10122.   (1) 
 
The bound (1) is not fixed, but grows with time as the horizon expands and encompasses more 
particles: 
 
Iuniverse ∝ t2.   (2) 
 
It is a simple matter, using quantum mechanics and thermodynamics, to also calculate the 
maximum amount of information that could have been processed (i.e. the total number of possible 
bit flips) in our causal region since the origin of the universe. The answer comes out again of 
order 10122 , taking into account Eq. (2), i.e. the fact that the causal region was smaller in the past 
and so encompassed less particles. 
A similar information bound may be derived from an entirely different line of argument, 
exploiting the link between physics and information discovered by Bekenstein9 and Hawking10 
when applying quantum mechanics to black holes. They found that an uncharged, non-rotating 
black hole possesses entropy S given by 
 
S = 4πkGM2/ћc3 = ¼A,    (3) 
 
where M and A are the mass and area of the black hole respectively, and the other symbols have 
their usual meanings as various fundamental constants of nature.  
The fact that the entropy is a function of black hole area, as opposed to volume, is deeply 
significant. In the case of a laboratory gas, for example, entropy is additive: twice the volume of a 
(homogeneous) gas will have twice the entropy. Evidently, when gravitation enters the picture, 
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the rules of the game change fundamentally. Entropy can been regarded as a measure of 
information I (or information loss), through the relationship 
 
S = klog2I    
   (4) 
 
so the Bekenstein-Hawking formula (3) relates the total information content of a region of space 
to the area of the surface encompassing that volume. The information inside a black hole is lost 
because an observer in the external region cannot access it on account of the fact that the surface 
of the hole is an event horizon. (There remains an unresolved issue about whether the information 
is permanently lost, or just rendered inaccessible until the black hole eventually evaporates. I 
shall not consider that topic further in this chapter.) A useful way to think about Eq. (3) is to 
define the Planck length LP ≡ (G/ћc3)½ as a fundamental unit, and note that, using Eq. (4), the 
information of the black hole is simply one quarter of the horizon area in Planck units. 
Early on, Bekenstein sought to generalize his result by postulating that Eq. (1) serves as a 
universal bound on entropy (or information content) applicable to any physical system11. That is, 
the information content of a physical system can never, he claims, exceed one quarter of the area 
of its encompassing surface. The black hole saturates the Bekenstein bound, and represents the 
maximum amount of information that can be packed into the volume occupied by the hole, as 
befits the equilibrium end state of a gravitating system. A simple argument in support of the 
universal Bekenstein bound is that if a system confined to a certain region of space possessed an 
information content in excess of the bound, one could then add some matter and induce this 
system to undergo gravitational collapse to a black hole, thereby reducing its entropy and 
violating the second law of thermodynamics (suitably generalized to include event horizon area). 
However, the Bekenstein bound remains a conjecture: a general proof is lacking. 
The idea of associating entropy and information with horizon area was soon extended to 
include all event horizons, not just those surrounding black holes. For example, if the universe 
becomes dominated by dark energy, which is what current astronomical observations suggest, it 
will continue to expand at an accelerating rate (dark energy acts as a sort of antigravity force). 
This creates a cosmological event horizon, which may be envisaged as a roughly spherical 
surface that bounds the region of the universe to which we can ever have causal and informational 
access. A similar horizon characterizes the period of inflation, widely believed to have occurred 
at about 10–34 s after the big bang. Generalizations of horizon entropy have been proposed for 
cosmological horizon area too, with de Sitter space (a universe subject to dark energy alone) 
saturating the Bekenstein bound, by Gibbons and Hawking12, Bousso13, and Davis and Davies14. 
A number of calculations support the proposal. 
Based on the foregoing ideas, ’t Hooft15 and Susskind16 have proposed the so-called 
holographic principle, according to which the information content of the entire universe is 
captured by an enveloping surface that surrounds it. The principle states that the total information 
content of a region of space cannot exceed one quarter of the surface area that confines it (other 
variants of the holographic principle have been proposed, with different definitions of the 
enveloping area), and that this limit is attained in the case of the cosmological event horizon. A 
simple calculation of the size of our universe’s event horizon today based on the size of the event 
horizon created by the measured value of dark energy gives an information bound of 10122 bits, 
the same as found by Lloyd using the particle horizon. The event horizon also expands with time, 
and at this epoch is roughly the same radius as the particle horizon, but unlike the latter, it 
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asymptotes to a constant value not a lot greater than its present value (assuming that the density 
of dark energy is constant). So whether we take the particle horizon or the event horizon, or a 
more generalized holographic principle, as the basis for the calculation, we discover an upper 
bound like (1) on the information content of a causal region of the universe. 
How might the bound affect physics and cosmology? The answer to this question depends 
critically on one’s assumptions about the nature of information. The traditional logical 
dependence of laws, states of matter and information is  
   
 A. laws of physics → matter → information. 
 
Thus, conventionally, the laws of physics form the absolute and eternal bedrock of physical 
reality and, as mentioned, cannot be changed by anything that happens in the universe. Matter 
conforms to the “given” laws, while information is a derived, or secondary property having to do 
with certain special states of matter. But several physicists have suggested that the logical 
dependence should really be as follows: 
 
 B. laws of physics → information → matter. 
 
In this scheme, often described informally by the dictum “the universe is a computer,” 
information is placed at a more fundamental level than matter. Nature is regarded as a vast 
information-processing system, and particles of matter are treated as special states which, when 
interrogated by, say, a particle detector, extract or process the underlying quantum state 
information so as to yield particle-like results. It is an inversion famously encapsulated by 
Wheeler’s pithy phrase ‘It from bit’17. Treating the universe as a computer has been advocated by 
Fredkin18, Lloyd8 and Wolfram19 among others.  
An even more radical transformation is to place information at the base of the logical 
sequence, thus 
 
 C. information → laws of physics → matter. 
 
The attraction of scheme C is that, after all, the laws of physics are informational statements.  
For most purposes the order of logical dependence does not matter much, but when it comes 
to the information bound on the universe, one is forced to confront the status of information: is it 
ontological or epistemological? If information is simply a description of what we know about the 
physical world, as is implied by Scheme A, there is no reason why Mother Nature should care 
about the limit (1). Or, to switch metaphors, the bedrock of physical reality according to Scheme 
A is sought in the perfect laws of physics, which live elsewhere, in the realm of the gods – the 
Platonic domain they are held by tradition to inhabit – where Mother Nature can compute to 
arbitrary precision with the unlimited quantity of information at her disposal. According to 
orthodoxy, the Platonic realm is the “real reality,” while the world of information is but the 
shadow on Plato’s cave. But if information underpins physical reality – if, so to speak, it occupies 
the ontological basement – (as is implied in Scheme C and perhaps B) then the bound on Iuniverse 
represents a fundamental limitation on all reality, not merely on states of the world that humans 
perceive.  
Someone who advocated precisely this latter position was Rolf Landauer, a former colleague 
of Chaitin’s at IBM. He explicitly took the view that “the universe computes in the universe,” 
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because he believed, as he was fond of declaring, that “information is physical.” And Landauer 
was quick to spot the momentous consequences of this shift in perspective: 
 
“The calculative process, just like the measurement process, is subject to some limitations.  A 
sensible theory of physics must respect these limitations, and should not invoke calculative 
routines that in fact cannot be carried out.”20 
 
In other words, in a universe limited in resources and time – a universe subject to the information 
bound (1) in fact – concepts like real numbers, infinitely precise parameter values, differentiable 
functions, the unitary evolution of a wave function – are a fiction: a useful fiction to be sure, but a 
fiction nevertheless, and with the potential to mislead. It then follows that the laws of physics, 
cast as idealized infinitely precise mathematical relationships inhabiting a Platonic heaven, are 
also a fiction when it comes to applications to the real universe. Landauer’s proposal that our 
theories should be constrained by the – possibly finite – resources of the universe has been 
independently developed in recent years by Benioff21. 
If one adopts Landauer’s philosophy, then some serious consequences follow. In effect, one 
cannot justify the application of the laws of physics in situations employing calculations that 
involve numbers greater than about 10122, and if one does, then one might expect to encounter 
departures between theory and experiment. What might this mean in practice? Well, for many 
purposes, the information bound is so large that the consequences are negligible. Take for 
example the law of conservation of electric charge. If this were to fail at the 10122 bit level of 
accuracy, the implications are hardly dire. (The law has been tested only to about one part in 
1012.)  
There are situations in which very large numbers routinely crop up in theoretical physics 
calculations. One obvious class of cases is where exponentiation occurs. Consider, for example, 
statistical mechanics, where Poincaré recurrence times are predicted to be of order exp(10N) 
Planck times (chosen to make the number dimensionless) and N is the number of particles in the 
system. Imposing a bound of 10122 implies that the recurrence time prediction is reliable only for 
recurrence times of about 1060 years. Again, this is so long we would be unlikely to notice any 
departure between theory and observation. Closely related is the problem of Laplace’s demon 
already discussed. Imposing the information bound renders the demonic prediction valueless 
almost immediately, because the bound will be exhausted after of order one bit-flip of the 10122 
degrees of freedom in the universe. Exponentiation arises in chaos theory too, via the Lyapunov 
coefficient. In these examples, the fact that the underlying deterministic mechanics might possess 
only finite precision is of little importance, because any uncertainties thereby generated are 
already totally swamped by the practical breakdown of predictability involved in complex and/or 
chaotic systems.  
A case of exponentiation in a relatively simple system occurs in general relativity in 
connection with the formation of event horizons. For example, when a star implodes to form a 
black hole, light leaving the surface of the star is exponentially redshifted with an e folding time 
typically of order a few microseconds. What happens, then, if the exponential redshift is cut off at 
10122 Planck lengths? The classical properties of the black hole are scarcely affected, but 
Hawking’s original derivation of black hole radiance is invalidated, as it already well known22.  
Inflation in the very early universe involves an exponential rate of expansion, i.e. a de Sitter 
phase, and this offers a stringent test of the information bound hypothesis. It is a key feature of 
the information bound that it is time-dependent. In the past, the bound was smaller, and its effects 
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on physics would have been greater (see Eq.(2)). During the very early universe, the effects could 
have been significant, and may have left a trace on the structure of the universe that could be used 
to test the existence of the bound. Inflation is a brief episode of exponential expansion thought to 
have occurred at about 10–34 s after the big bang. At that time, the horizon size was about 3×10–24 
cm, yielding a surface of about 10–19 Planck areas. The information bound then implies for the 
cosmological scale factor change 
 
a(tafter)/a(tbefore) < 1019.   (5) 
 
Guth’s original proposal was for an inflation factor at least 1020, so (given the rough-and-
ready nature of the calculation) the information bound is consistent with inflation, but only 
marginally so, and a more detailed analysis may suggest observable consequences, such as a 
measurable departure from spatial flatness. 
Another class of problems in which large numbers are unavoidable is quantum mechanics and 
quantum field theory, and it is to that topic that I now turn. 
 
3. The quantum vacuum 
 
In quantum mechanics the state of the system is described by a vector in a Hilbert space. For a 
generic problem, the Hilbert space will possess an infinite number of dimensions. Clearly this 
construction comes into conflict with the information bound hypothesis. A simple example of the 
problem concerns the energy of the quantum vacuum, evaluated by summing zero point modes 
over an infinite set of simple harmonic oscillators23. For a massless scalar field confined to a cube 
of space of linear dimension L, the energy density ρ of the vacuum is given by 
  ρ = ½ћcL–1∑ ω,    (5) 
                     k 
 
where the sum is taken over all the field modes of momentum k. The right hand side of Eq. (5) 
diverges like ~ ω4 as ω→ ∞. It may be rendered finite by imposing a cut-off in the summation. A 
natural cut-off is provided by the Planck frequency, which incorporates only the fundamental 
constants already present in the theory: ћ, c and G. Using this cut-off, Eq. (5) yields a vacuum 
energy density of 10113 Jm–3, which is some 10122 times the observed dark energy density. This 
staggering discrepancy between theory and observation has been known for many years, and is 
known as the dark energy (or cosmological constant) problem. It is one of the main outstanding 
challenges to physical theory. 
The occurrence of the same factor 10122 in this discrepancy as in the cosmological information 
bound is a clear pointer to an alternative explanation for dark energy, and indeed, inequality (1) 
provides a second natural cut-off for the summation in Eq. (5). Rewriting (5) in terms of modes, 
 
ρ ≈ ћcL–4∑n4.   (6) 
 
If it is now argued that the sum ∑n4 should be bounded by (1), then taking L to be the horizon 
radius (roughly a Hubble radius) and ∑n4 ~ 10122, we may evaluate the vacuum energy density to 
be 
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ρ ≈ 10−9 Jm–3  ≈ ρobserved.   (7) 
 
The same result may be derived in a completely different way, by imposing the condition on 
the vacuum energy that at every scale of size L, the energy density must not exceed the level at 
which the total mass within a volume L3 is greater than the mass of a black hole of size L, 
otherwise the vacuum energy would presumably undergo gravitational collapse. This requirement 
may be expressed as follows: 
 
ρc2L3 < Mbh(L).   (8) 
 
Substituting the right hand side of Eq. (5) for ρ we obtain, to an order or magnitude, 
 
Gћω4L3/c7 < L   (9) 
 
or 
 
 ρ < c4/GL2   (10) 
 
Taking L to be the Hubble radius, inequality (10) may be re-cast in the following suggestive 
form24: 
 
ρ < (ρPρH)½  ≈ 10−9 Jm–3  ≈ ρobserved     (11) 
 
where ρP is the Planck energy density and ρH is the Hubble energy density, defined to be the 
energy density of a single quantum in a Hubble volume with a wavelength equal to the Hubble 
radius.  
This remarkable result – that the cosmological information bound explains the magnitude of 
the dark energy – comes at a price, however. The same reasoning may be applied to the pressure 
of the vacuum, p, which for a massless scalar field is  
 
p = – ½ћcL–1∑ ω,    (12) 
 
i.e. p = – ρ, which is the necessary equation of state for the vacuum energy to play the role of dark 
energy. Now recall that the information bound varies with time in the manner indicated by Eq. 
(2). Hence the cut-off in the summation in both Eqs. (5) and (12) will be time-dependent, so the 
dark energy is also predicted to be time-dependent. This raises an immediate difficulty with the 
law of energy conservation: 
 
pda3 + d(ρa3) = 0   (15) 
 
which can be satisfied for a time-dependent p and ρ only if there is some compensatory change, 
e.g. G and/or c vary with time. There is a substantial literature on such holographic cosmological 
models25, including comparison with observations, which I shall not review here. 
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4. Quantum information processing 
 
As a final application of the information bound hypothesis, let me turn to non-relativistic 
quantum mechanics. A transformation in our understanding of information came with the 
recognition that because nature is fundamentally quantum mechanical, the rules for information 
processing at the quantum level differ not only in the technical details but in their very conceptual 
basis from the classical case. In conventional (classical) information theory, the basic unit is the 
bit, or binary choice, usually symbolized by 0 and 1. In quantum mechanics, the bit is replaced by 
a more abstract entity: the qubit. When humans read out the information content of a quantum 
system, they appropriate only bits – the act of read-out collapses qubits into bits. But the 
importance of quantum information dynamics is that in an isolated unobserved quantum system, 
the qubits generally evolve in a manner completely different from the classical case, involving the 
whole panoply of quantum weirdness, including, most crucially, superposition and entanglement. 
It is this feature that has commended quantum information science to governments and business 
by holding out the promise of large-scale quantum computation. By exploiting qubit dynamics, a 
quantum computer would represent an unprecedented leap in computational power26. 
The key to quantum computation lies with the exponential character of quantum states. 
Whereas a classical binary switch is either on (1) or off (0), a quantum system can be in a 
superposition of the two. Furthermore, a multi-component quantum system can incorporate 
entanglement of spatially separated subsystems. Combining these two properties implies that an 
n-component system (e.g. n atoms) can have 2n states, or components of the wave function, that 
describe the system. If it were possible to control all the components, or branches, of the wave 
function simultaneously, then the quantum system would be able to process information 
exponentially more powerfully than a classical computer. This is the aspiration of the quantum 
computation project.  
Because the complexity of an entangled state rises exponentially with the number of qubits 
(which is its virtue), large-scale quantum information processing comes into conflict with the 
information bound. Specifically, a quantum state with more components than about n = log2 
Iuniverse will require more bits of information to specify it than can be accommodated in the entire 
observable universe! Using the bound given by inequality (1), this yields a limit of approximately 
n = 400. In other words, a generic entangled state of more than about 400 particles will have a 
quantum state with more components than Iuniverse, evolving in a Hilbert space with more 
dimensions than Iuniverse. The question therefore arises of whether this violation of the information 
bound (1) signals a fundamental physical limit. It seems to me that it must.  
On the face of it, the limit of 400 particles is stringent enough to challenge the quantum 
computation industry, in which a long-term objective is to entangle many thousands or even 
millions of particles and control the evolution of the quantum state to high precision. The 
foregoing analysis, however, is overly simplistic. First, note that the dimensionality of the (non-
redundant part of the) Hilbert space is not an invariant number: by changing the basis, the number 
might be reduced. So specifying the complexity of a quantum state simply by using the 
dimensionality of the Hilbert space can be misleading. A more relevant criterion is the number of 
independent parameters needed to specify inequivalent n-component quantum systems. This 
problem has been addressed, but it is a difficult one on which only limited progress has so far 
been made27.  
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Second, the dimensionality of the Hilbert space serves to define the number of amplitudes 
needed to specify a generic superposition. But the amplitudes themselves require additional 
information to specify them; indeed, a single complex number coefficient αi will mostly contain 
an infinite number of bits of information. If we are to take the bound (1) seriously, then it must be 
applied to the total algorithmic information content of the amplitude set over the entire Hilbert 
space. Following Chaitin, the algorithmic information measure of a binary string X is defined as 
 
H(X) = – ln P(X) + O(1)   (16) 
 
where P(X) is the probability that the proverbial monkey typing randomly on a typewriter will 
generate a program which, when run on a universal Turing machine, will output X. Applied to the 
amplitude set {αi} of a generic quantum state (plus any ancillary information needed to specify 
the state, such as constraints), the cosmological information bound (1) may be expressed as 
follows: 
 
H({αi}) < Aholo/LP2   (17) 
   
where Aholo is the area of the appropriate holographic surface (e.g. a cosmological event horizon). 
Inequality (17) is a stronger constraint than (1), appropriate to the interpretation of information as 
ontological and fundamental, and therefore including not merely a head-count of the degrees of 
freedom, but the algorithmic information content of all the specifying parameters of the state too. 
This extra informational burden on the bound will reduce somewhat the dimensionality of the 
Hilbert space at which unitary evolution is expected to break down. 
A more subtle issue concerns the specific objectives of quantum computation, which is not to 
control the dynamical evolution of arbitrary entangled quantum states, but an infinitesimal subset 
associated with certain mathematical problems of interest, such as factoring. It is trivially true that 
it is impossible to prepare, even approximately, a state containing more than 10122 truly 
independent parameters because it is impossible to even specify such a state: there are not enough 
bits in the universe to contain the specification. Almost all states fall into this category of being 
impossible to specify, prepare and control. So in this elementary sense, generic quantum 
computation is obviously impossible. Less obvious, however, is whether the subset of states (of 
measure zero) of interest to the computing industry is affected by the cosmological information 
bound, for even if it is the case that the number of independent amplitudes exceeds 10122, there 
may exist a compact mathematical algorithm to generate those amplitudes. (The algorithm for 
generating the amplitudes that specify the initial state should not be confused with the algorithm 
to be executed by the quantum computer dynamics.) For example, the amplitudes of the quantum 
computer’s initial state could be the (unending) digits of π, which can be generated by a short 
algorithm. That is, the set of amplitudes may contain an unbounded number of bits of 
information, but a finite (and even small) number of bits might be sufficient to define the 
generating algorithm of the amplitude set. So if the information bound on the universe is 
interpreted as an upper limit on the algorithmic information (as opposed to the Shannon 
information), then a measure-zero subset of initial states can be specified without violating the 
cosmological information bound. But this loophole leaves many unanswered questions. For 
example, a mathematical specification is one thing, a physical process to implement that 
specification – and to do so in an acceptable period of time – is another. To take the cited 
example, it is far from clear that there exists any physical process that can create an entangled 
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quantum state in which the amplitudes (enumerated in some sequence) are the digits of π. And 
even if this further problem is satisfactorily addressed, one has to confront the fact that as the 
initial state evolves, and the amplitudes change, so the set of amplitudes may not remain 
algorithmically compressible. To be sure, a unitary evolution of an initially algorithmically 
compressible state will, by definition, preserve algorithmic compressibility (because the unitary 
operation is an algorithm). But such a pure system is unstable: the inevitability of random errors 
due to the fact that the quantum system is not closed will raise the algorithmic complexity, and 
seemingly raise it above the bound (1) in pretty short order28. This uncovers a deeper set of 
issues, which is whether a quantum state that cannot be specified, and is in principle unknowable, 
and the amplitude set of which exceeds the total information capacity of the universe, may 
nevertheless still be said to exist and conform to physical law. According to the Landauer point of 
view I am articulating here, the answer is no. 
 
5. Unfinished business 
 
I have been asked what, exactly, would go wrong if one tried to build and operate a quantum 
computer with, say, 500 entangled qubits. First let me make a general point. In science, one 
always has to distinguish between mathematical possibility contained in a theory, and physical 
possibility. For example, general relativity contains mathematical models with closed timelike 
world lines, but these may be inconsistent with cosmological boundary conditions or some other 
global requirement29. So the fact that a unitary transformation that implements a desirable 
quantum computation may exist mathematically does not necessarily mean it can be implemented 
physically, even in principle. And in fact, a prima face example would seem to be the expectation 
that the resources needed to prepare an initial quantum state are expected to grow with its 
complexity, and would require more and more of the surrounding universe to be commandeered, 
and more yet for the error correction of its evolution. Inevitably, the gravitational effects of the 
commandeered matter will eventually become important. Before the complexity of the state 
reached the cosmological bound of 10122, the entire resources of the observable universe would 
necessarily be exhausted. Thus, almost all quantum initial states, and hence almost all unitary 
transformations, seem to be ruled out by the cosmological constraint (1) (if one accepts it). It is 
important to realize, however, that this restriction may not be an impediment to preparing an 
algorithmically simple state, providing a physical mechanism can be found to implement the 
preparation algorithm. These criteria will undoubtedly be satisfied for the (very limited) examples 
of known quantum algorithms, such as Shor’s algorithm for factorization, which is 
algorithmically simple by definition, since its input state can be specified and there is a simple 
association between the input data and the initial quantum state. What is less clear is whether this 
ease of preparation of the initial state is representative of a broader class of problems of interest, 
or remains confined to a handful of special cases. 
A more radical conjecture about what might go wrong concerns the subsequent evolution of 
the state, which entails an escalation of the algorithmic complexity through the cosmological 
information bound due to random errors in the manner I mentioned above. Under these 
circumstances, it may be that the unitary evolution of the state actually breaks down (over and 
above the breakdown caused by tracing out the degrees of freedom associated with the errors 
caused by environmental disturbances). This would manifest itself in the form of an additional 
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source of errors, ultimately of cosmological origin, in a manner such that all error-correcting 
protocols applied to these errors would fail to converge. What I am suggesting here seems to be 
close to the concept of unavoidable intrinsic decoherence proposed by Milburn30. Some 
clarification of these issues may emerge from the further study of the recent discovery that the 
entropy of quantum entanglement of a harmonic lattice also scales like area rather than volume31, 
which would seem to offer support for the application of the holographic principle to entangled 
states. It would be good to know how general the entanglement-area relationship might be. 
Finally, I should point out that the information bound (1) was derived using quantum field 
theory, but that same bound applies to quantum field theory. Ideally one should derive the bound 
using a self-consistent treatment. If one adopts the philosophy that information is primary and 
ontological, then such a self-consistency argument should be incorporated in a larger program 
directed at unifying mathematics and physics. If, following Landauer, one accepts that 
mathematics is meaningful only if it is the product of real computational processes (rather than 
existing independently in a Platonic realm) then there is a self-consistent loop: the laws of physics 
determine what can be computed, which in turn determines the informational basis of those same 
laws of physics. Benioff has considered a scheme in which mathematics and the laws of physics 
co-emerge from a deeper principle of mutual self-consistency32, thus addressing Wigner’s 
question of why mathematics is so “unreasonably effective” in describing the physical world.33 I 
have discussed these deeper matters elsewhere34. 
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